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I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2008, a federal district court judge from northern Florida found
himself regretfully stating that in the case before him "the United States Courts
have no power to right the wrong perpetrated upon one of its citizens."'
Americans have long been wary of subjecting individual interests to external
laws. Such fears date back to the days of the Continental Congress, when
separate states " 'grudgingly' " surrendered " 'part of their precious
sovereignty' "to form the nation itself.2 This deeply rooted apprehension has
been cited as one of the foremost reasons the United States is less willing than
its European counterparts to subject its people to transnational law or to allow
them to be tried in international courts.3 Yet, in a case that involved the liberty
and very livelihood of an American citizen, the U.S. court system was
powerless to offer him relief.4 Instead, he had to seek redress from the
supreme court of a foreign nation.5
This was the case of Justin Gatlin, an Olympic sprinter who faced a four-
year ban from his sport based on a positive test for exogenous testosterone
in 2006.6 The four-year ban was enforced despite the fact that the punishment
for a first time doping offense is two years.7 Gatlin was subjected to the more
severe penalty because of a "paperwork" violation,8 the result of a previous
positive test in 2001, caused by use of doctor-prescribed Adderall in treatment
of his Attention Deficit Disorder.9 Although the International Association of
Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc.,No. 3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2567657,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008).
2 Lauren Fielder Redman, United States Implementation of the International Criminal
Court: Toward the Federalism of Free Nations, 17 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 37 (2007)
(referencing the atmosphere at the 1787-1788 Constitutional Convention) (quoting Lawrence
Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the Struggle for an ICC, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRvIINAL COuRT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85, 88 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000)).
' See Abbas Ravjani, The Court ofArbitration for Sport: A Subtle Form of International
Delegation, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 241, 243 (2009) ("Most countries and international
sports federations have acceded to the jurisdiction of the CAS [Court of Arbitration for Sport],
despite some countries, including the United States, being concerned about the threat of their
nationals being tried by foreigners in forums such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).").
4 Gatlin, 2008 WL 2567657, at *2.
5 Id. at*l.
6 Amy Shipley, Gatlin Loses Fight, Receives 4-Year Doping Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008,
at E02.
7Id.
Gatlin, 2008 WL 2567657, at *2.
9 Shipley, supra note 6.
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Athletics Federations (IAAF) had reinstated Gatlin because the drug was used
for legitimate medical purposes, the positive test was later deemed by an
international panel of private arbitrators-and wrongfully so in the eyes of the
U.S. district court judge-grounds for imposing sanctions for a second
offense.'0 This resulted in extending the time of Gatlin's ban from sport."
In pleading his case, Gatlin found himself caught in a web of national and
international dispute resolution procedures and emerging lex sportiva, which
govern international sports.' 2 He was not the first American athlete to
experience such a predicament. American cyclist, ostensible winner of
the 2006 Tour de France, and accused doper, Floyd Landis also pursued a
quagmire of arbitral and judicial procedures in seeking to clear his name.
Landis ultimately withdrew his petition seeking vacatur of an international
arbitral award in a U.S. court as a condition of regaining his license to return
to professional cycling although he had served a full two-year suspension. 3
Gatlin and Landis are likely not the only American athletes to wonder why the
U.S. legal system is realistically unavailable to them.
Cases involving the eligibility or disciplinary sanction of U.S. Olympic
athletes typically begin in the United States, in a "binding arbitration"
administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 4 Thereafter,
however, the rules governing dispute resolution in international sports,
including the Olympic Charter and those adopted by international and national
sport federations, provide for a de novo hearing, or "appeal" of the national
"o Id. The U.S. district courtjudge refers to the decisions made byarbitrators as "capricious"
and refers to Gatlin's doping with Adderall as "inadvertent." Gatlin, WL 2567657, at *1-2
(quoting USADA's stipulation that "Mr. Gatlin neither cheated nor intended to cheat. He did
not intend to enhance his performance nor, given his medical condition, did his medication in
fact enhanced his performance."). Gatlin's challenge to the second violation charge was first
heard before an American Arbitration Association panel, and then appealed to an international
panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Both arbitral panels concluded that Gatlin had
committed a second violation. Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2008/A/1461 &
CAS/2008/A/1462 (final award Sept. 10, 2008) (appeals consolidated), available athttp://www.
tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/2153/5048/0/award%201461 %20+%201462%20intemet.pdf.
H Shipley, supra note 6.
12 Ravjani, supra note 3, at 243; see generally James A.R. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva and CAS,
in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, at 409 (Ian S. Blackshaw et al.
eds., 2006) (explaining that lex sportiva usually refers to the evolving precedent being created
by the Court of Arbitration for Sport as the court applies it throughout international sporting
federations, and events like the Olympic Games).
13 See Landis Drops Suit, VELONEWS, Dec. 6,2008, http://www.velonews.com/article/85653.
14 See Maureen A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process Dangers
for Accused Athletes in International Sports, 10 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 5 (2009).
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arbitration award to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Switzerland.15
The appeal to CAS is available not only to either named party, but also to other
sport authorities which need not necessarily have participated in the domestic
arbitration.'6 Thus, in a recent case involving the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency's
(USADA) prosecution of U.S. cyclist Tyler Hamilton, who admitted to taking
a steroid in an herbal remedy for depression, that resulted in an eight-year
sanction, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) filed an appeal to the CAS
asking that a lifetime ban be imposed on Hamilton. 7 In a similar situation,
although Justin Gatlin had filed an appeal against USADA of his AAA
decision to CAS, the IAAF, which did not participate in the AAA hearing,
filed an appeal of the same decision, seeking a lifetime ban rather than accept
the arbitral panel's four-year sanction. 8 More problematically, in the case of
U.S. Swimmer Jessica Hardy, who tested positive for Clenbuteral just weeks
before the 2008 Summer Olympics, the AAA panel found that Hardy's positive
test resulted from a contaminated nutritional supplement. Considering the
circumstances, the panel imposed a one-year ineligibility period. 9 Days before
1" INT'L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, STATUES OF THE BODIES WORKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
SPORTS-RELATED DISPUTES R47 (2009) [hereinafter CAS CODE], available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/d2wfiles/document/281/5048/0/3.1%2OCodeEngnov2004.pdf. The CAS Code is also
referred to as the Code of Sport-Related Arbitration.
16 See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 13.2.3 (2009)
[hereinafter WADA CODE], available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_
v2009_En.pdf (identifying persons entitled to appeal to CAS as: "(a) the Athlete... who is the
subject of the decision being appealed; (b) the other party to the case in which the decision was
rendered; (c) the relevant International Federation; (d) the National Anti-Doping
Organization... (e) the International Olympic Committee... ; and 09 WADA" (emphasis
added)).
"' Press Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport, WADA Refers the Case of Tyler Hamilton
to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (July 16, 2009) (on file with author); see also
WADA CODE, supra note 16, art. 13.1.1 ("Where WADA has a right to appeal. . . and no other
party has appealed a final decision within the Anti-Doping Organization's process, WADA may
appeal such decision directly to CAS without having to exhaust other remedies in the Anti-
Doping Organization process."). The WADA appeal is significant because an athlete under a
lifetime ban is precluded from involvement in any capacity under the control of Olympic-
affiliated bodies. See Charles Pelkey, The Explainer- What Happened to the Lifetime Ban?,
VELONEWS, June 17, 2009, http://www.velonews.com/article/93523/the-explainer-what-happ
ened-to-the-lifetime-ban.
18 Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2008/A/l 461 & CAS/2008/A/1462 (final award
of Sept. 10, 2008) (appeals consolidated), available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/docum
ent/2153/5048/0/award%20146 1%20+%201462%20intemet.pdf. The IAAF contended that
Gatlin committed a second anti-doping violation and should be declared ineligible for life. Id.
at 6.
"9 U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Hardy, AAA No. 77 190 00288 08, 7.39 (interim award
20091
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Hardy's positive test, however, the International Olympic Committee (JOC)
had amended Rule 45 of the Olympic Charter to add a provision making an
athlete ineligible for the next two Olympic Games after receiving a doping
suspension for more than six months.2" Thus, Hardy's one-year suspension
rendered her effectively banned from competing at the 2012 Games. As to
Hardy, the AAA called the new IOC penalty "evidently grossly
disproportionate" and "far in excess of what should be expected when applying
the principles of fundamental justice and fairness in the circumstances of this
case." 21 The AAA panel reserved the right to cut the length of the suspension
to six months if the IOC rejected Hardy's waiver request from the Rule 45
amendment.22 Both WADA and the International Swimming Federation
(FINA) filed an appeal with CAS, seeking a two-year suspension.23
In such cases, the athlete is required to bear the expense, time, and
uncertainty of a second proceeding before an international panel of sport
arbitrators.24 Even where an athlete serves a full suspension imposed under an
arbitrated ruling, the athlete may be subjected to further sanction by the
governing body or sports federation. The "binding arbitration" and seeming
resolution at the national level can become unraveled by anti-doping
authorities' ability to bring the charges fresh before an international arbitral
tribunal. Although this process is not necessarily double jeopardy,26 it is
of May 20, 2009).
20 Id. 7.29-7.30.
21 Id. 7.39.
22 Id. 7.43-7.46.
23 Press Release, Court of Arbitration for Sport, FINA and WADA Refer the Case of Jessica
Hardy to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (May 29,2009), http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wf
iles/document/3284/5048/0/2009.05.29%20PR%2OEng.pdf(matter pending as of July 30,2009).
24 See Hardy, AAA No. 77190 00288 08, 8.7 ("The parties shall bear their own costs
and attorney's fees."); see also infra note 61 (noting that the CAS proceedings itself are provided
to the parties free of charge).
25 Floyd Landis served a two-year suspension, as required for a first doping violation under
the World Anti-Doping Code. Landis Drops Suit, supra note 13. However, the International
Cycling Federation (UCI) imposes an additional sanction precluding athletes who have served
their sanction from participating in international cycling competitions. UNION CYCLISTE
INTERNATIONALE (UCI), ANTI-DOPING RULES OF THE UCI 313 (2009), available at http://www.
uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?Menuld=&ObjTypeCode=FILE&type=FILE&id=ND
c3MDk&Langld=l.
26 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a defendant from being tried twice
for the same crime after an acquittal or conviction and from receiving multiple punishments for
the same crime. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The general rule against double jeopardy has been
recognized by a number of other nations as well, evinced by a double jeopardy clause within the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Lorraine Finlay, Does the International
Criminal Court Protect Against Double Jeopardy: An Analysis of Article 20 of the Rome
[Vol. 38:97
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arguably similar and certainly more costly and time-consuming for all
involved.
Although Gatlin had sought recourse in the U.S. judicial system, as
indicated by the federal district judge in his appeal, CAS rules provide that its
decisions may only be reviewed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT).27 The
SFT rarely overturns a decision made by CAS.2' Rather, the SFT has given the
CAS a stamp of legitimacy that sets the bar for vacatur exceedingly high.29
This Article questions the process of having both a domestic and international
tribunal decide the fate of athletes when the international arbitral panel
essentially operates as a court of first and final appeal, abrogating any
authority or finality in the local decision. This result not only undermines the
finality envisioned by Congress when charging the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) to implement a process for the "swift and equitable
resolution" of Olympic sports-related disputes, it ironically illustrates how the
Statute, 15 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 221,225-26 (2009). While the adjudicatory process
for prosecuting doping violations does not involve governmental authorities per se, some
contend the process has been so entwined as to amount to state action. See Paul C. McCaffrey,
Note, Playing Fair: Why the United States Anti-Doping Agency's Performance-Enhanced
Adjudications Should Be Treated as State Action, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 645, 648 (2006)
(arguing that "USADA doping adjudications using the 'comfortable satisfaction' standard of
proof may fairly be characterized as state action"). In the context of international sports
arbitration, the first hearing occurs before a national arbitral panel and the second hearing is
before an international panel.
27 Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2567657,
at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 24,2008). The judge refers to a "Swiss Supreme Court," which accurately
conveys its function, but the court is actually named the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
28 See Matthew J. Mitten, Judicial Review of Olympic and International Sports Arbitration
Awards: Trends and Observations, 10 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 51,52-54 (2009) (reviewing CAS
decisions brought before the SFT from 1992 to 2009, noting that the SFT has vacated very few
awards); see also Antonio Rigozzi, Available Remedies against CAS Awards, in SPORT
GOVERNANCE, FOOTBALL DISPUTES, DOPING AND CAS ARBITRATION: CAS & FSA/SAV
CONFERENCE LAUSANNE 2008, at 95 (M. Bernasconi & Antonio Rigozzi, eds., forthcoming
Nov. 2009) (providing overview of CAS awards reviewed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal).
29 See Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal
Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 80-81 (2008)
(noting that the SFT considers CAS to be" 'a body which reviews the facts and the law with full
powers of investigation and complete freedom to issue a new decision in place of the body that
gave the previous ruling ... the CAS is more akin to a judicial authority independent of the
parties' "); see also Darren Kane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court ofArbitration
for Sport, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 611 (2003) (discussing the development of CAS lex sportiva).
In 2008, a record number of 318 proceedings in a single year were filed with CAS.
TAS/CAS, Important Dates in the CAS History, http://www.tas-cas.org/statistics (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009).
2009]
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United States has implicitly assigned the protection of the rights of its citizens
to a private international tribunal seated in a foreign nation.3"
Part II of this Article discusses the process by which Olympic-level athletes
may seek first-instance arbitration through AAA, which is subject to appeal
and final determination by the CAS, situated in Switzerland. Part I1 explores
the process and limited options for the judicial review of CAS awards under
domestic and international arbitration laws. Part IV considers the role of the
U.S. legal system, if any, in the review of sport arbitral awards through the
cases of Gatlin and Landis, where each sought to vacate CAS awards in U.S.
federal court. Part V concludes by proposing a model of appellate, rather than
de novo, arbitral review by CAS hearings where an underlying domestic
arbitration panel of national CAS arbitrators previously renders an award.
II. ARBITRATION AS AN ExcLusIvE MEANS FOR OLYMPIC SPORTS
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Domestic Arbitration for U.S. Athletes Competing in International Sports
In the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (ASA), Congress designated the United
States Olympic Committee (USOC)3 as a federally chartered corporation to
act as the exclusive governing body for matters related to U.S. participation in
the Olympic Games and international athletic competition.32 The Act provides
specifically that:
the [USOC] shall establish and maintain provisions in its
constitution and bylaws for the swift and equitable resolution of
disputes involving any of its members and relating to the
30 See Ravjani, supra note 3, at 266-69 (asserting that the United States has delegated its
authority on international sports directly to private national actors, such as the USOC, and
indirectly to CAS, an international tribunal).
"' Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (ASA), Pub. L. No. 95-606, 92 Stat. 3045 (1978). In 1998,
the Act was amended and renamed the Ted Stevens Olympic & Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.
§§ 220501-220529 (2006).
32 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503(3), 220505(c). The USOC is the National Olympic Committee
(NOC) for the United States, as recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The
IOC is the governing authority for the Olympic movement and recognizes NOCs and
International Sports Federations (IFs), which administer specific sports. NOCs and IFs, in turn,
recognize National Governing Bodies (NGBs) "to administer and govern a particular sport
within that country." Weston, supra note 14, at 14. There are currently 205 NOCs over five
continents. See INT'LOLYMPICCOMMITrEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER (2007), http://multimedia.olym
pic.org/pdf/en_report_1 22.pdf.
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opportunity of an amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager,
administrator, or official to participate in the Olympic Games, the
Paralympic Games, the Pan-American Games, world
championship competition, or other protected competition as
defined in the constitution and bylaws of the [USOC]. 3
The section further states that:
[i]n any lawsuit relating to the resolution of a dispute involving
the opportunity of an amateur athlete to participate in the
Olympic Games, . . . a court shall not grant injunctive relief
against the [USOC] within 21 days before the beginning of such
games if the [USOC] ... has provided a sworn statement.., that
it[ ]... cannot provide for the resolution of such dispute prior to
the beginning of such games.34
The statute contemplates that the USOC will implement private dispute
resolution procedures, using the American Arbitration Association (AAA); yet,
it also acknowledges the possibility of an athlete pursuing eligibility
determinations through the court system.35
33 36 U.S.C. § 220509(a).
" Id. The purpose of this provision is to avoid judicial interference in eligibility and team
selection decisions on the eve of the Olympic Games. Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass'n, 227
F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). A history of litigation and judicial orders regarding athlete
participation in Olympic and international sporting events, considered disruptive, preceded this
provision. See Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003 (ordering, over USOC's objection and despite
conflicting arbitral decisions between competitors for nomination to Olympic Team, enforcement
of award which had been confirmed before entering of the second conflicting award); Reynolds
v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1112-13 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting the IAAF's
refusal to accept the U.S. arbitral award or order by the U.S. Supreme Court to allow the athlete
to compete); Mary K. Fitzgerald, The Court ofArbitration for Sport: Dealing with Doping and
Due Process During the Olympics, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 219 (2000) (describing TAC, the
National Governing Body (NGB), as "caught in the crossfire between U.S. courts and the
IAAF").
3' 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a) (stating "[a] party aggrieved by the determination of the
[USOC] ... may obtain review" by filing a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA)). Although the Act charges the USOC "to establish and maintain
provisions.. . for the swift and equitable resolution of disputes" involving athletes, it precludes
a court from granting injunctive relief within twenty-one days of the start of an Olympic
event. 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a). See also U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., BYLAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE §§ 9.7-9.8 (2008) [hereinafter BYLAWS OF THE USOC] (providing for
binding arbitration of athlete complaints, including affected parties), available at http://assets.
teamusa.org/assets/documents/attachedfile/filename/4076/USOCBylaws_07.01.08_execut
2009]
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The Act's reference to arbitration is specific to National Governing Bodies
(NGBs), which "represent the United States in the appropriate international
sports federation" and designate individuals and teams to be the American
representatives in international sports competition.36 An NGB for each sport
may be recognized only if it "agrees to submit to binding arbitration in any
controversy involving -- (A) its recognition as a national governing body... ;
and (B) the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager,
,,31
administrator or official to participate in amateur athletic competition ....
These hearings are to be conducted in accordance with the AAA's Commercial
Rules of Arbitration.38
The USOC has contracted with the United States Anti-Doping Agency
(USADA) to administer doping-control, education, research, and adjudication
for United States athletes competing in Olympic and international sports,
consistent with the World Anti-Doping Program.39 Athletes participating in
sanctioned international competitions must agree to comply with the World
Anti-Doping Code (WADC), thus requiring athletes to submit to random in
and out-of competition doping control testing for prohibited substances.4"
USADA has similarly incorporated the option for domestic arbitration through
ed_.pdf. This process does not include claims of anti-doping violations or general field of play
decisions. BYLAWS OF THE USOC, supra, §§ 9.11-9.12.
36 36 U.S.C. § 220523(a).
Id. § 220522(a)(4).
38 Id.; see also infra note 41.
39 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY [USADA], PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC
MOVEMENT TESTING 1 (2009) [hereinafter USADAPRoTOCOL]. USADA is an "independent,
non-governmental anti-doping agency," which has full authority to implement anti-doping
programs, testing, and adjudication in the United States. See U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, FAQs,
http://www.usantidoping.org/resources/faqs.aspx?showAll=l (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). The
Agency "has authority to test: any athlete who is a member of a National Governing Body
(NGB)" and "any athlete participating at a competition sanctioned by the [USOC] or a NGB."
Id. USADA also conducts "testing for International Federations (IFs), other National Anti-
Doping Organizations (NADOs) and the World Anti-Doping Agency." Id.
40 USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 39, 4-5. The WADC contains the list of banned
substances and provides a framework for the anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within
sport organizations. Id. at Annex A. All IOC recognized sport federations have adopted the
WADC into their respective sporting rules to which athletes must abide. See Weston, supra
note 14, at 25 (noting that the requirement under the Olympic Charter for all members of the
Olympic Movement to adopt and implement the WADC). Proceedings for violations of anti-
doping rules are technically brought by the sport governing body, which may delegate
prosecution authority to the anti-doping agency, such as USADA. Accordingly, WADA is itself
is not a party to these cases, yet it is accorded standing to intervene at the CAS level. See
discussion infra Part II.C.3.
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the AAA to adjudicate doping charges involving U.S. athletes.4 Doping cases
are administered in accordance with the AAA Supplementary Procedures for
the Arbitration of Olympic Sport Doping Disputes (Supplementary
Procedures). Under the Supplementary Procedures, accused athletes may opt
for a hearing before a panel of three arbitrators who are listed both on AAA
and CAS rosters (AAA/CAS), although CAS and AAA are separate
organizations." The AAA decision may be appealed directly to CAS, or the
athlete may elect to bypass the AAA process and proceed directly to CAS for
final and binding determination.43
The intent of designating an arbitral process is to provide swift resolution
to disputes for athletes seeking to participate in the Olympic Games.
Arbitration is thought to be faster and less costly, and it provides a certainty
of forum for the resolution of disputes. Arbitration here is not truly voluntary,
as athletes wishing to compete in the Olympic Games must sign a waiver
agreeing to submit to the final review of any appealed claim to CAS." This
41 USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 39, 12. USADA's testing and adjudicatory process is
guided by the USADA Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing. Id. The AAA hearings
involving doping disputes are governed by commercial arbitration rules, as modified by the
"Supplementary Procedures." AM. ARB. ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE
ARBITRATION OF ANTI-DOPING RULE VIOLATIONS R-1 (2009) [hereinafter AAA SupP. PROC.],
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627.
42 AM. ARB. ASS'N, SPORTS ARBITRATION INCLUDING OLYMPIC ATHLETE DISPUTES 4 (AAA
Online Library 2006), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4700. As of May 1, 2009, the eligible pool
of AAA arbitrators for anti-doping cases was limited to CAS arbitrators who are U.S. citizens.
AM. ARB. ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE ARBITRATION OF ANTI-DOPING RULE
VIOLATIONS, at R-3 (2009) [hereinafter AAA SUPP. PROC.], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.
asp?id=28627. Under the 2004 AAA rules, the pool of arbitrators included AAA arbitrators also
on the North American CAS panel. AM. ARB. ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE
ARBITRATION OF OLYMPIC SPORT DOPING DISPUTES, at R-3 (2004).
4' The term "appeal" is arguably a misnomer because the CAS review is de novo; however,
the applicable regulations use the term "appeal" to describe this process. USADA PROTOCOL,
supra note 39, 15(b) (providing that "[t]he final award by the AAA/CAS arbitrator(s) may be
appealed to the CAS"); see also CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R47 ("An appeal against the
decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with the CAS insofar
as the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or as the parties have concluded a
specific arbitration agreement and insofar as the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies
available to him prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of the said
sports-related body.").
4 Rule 59 of the OLYMPIC CHARTER requires that any disputes "arising on the occasion of,
or in connection with, the Olympic Games," including an athlete's eligibility to participate in the
Olympics, shall be submitted exclusively to the CAS. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 32, at
Rule 59; see also Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic
Athletes: Is the Process Better or Worse for "Job Security"?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 655, 664
2009]
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condition applies also to athletes participating in international sports
competitions generally. International sports federations within the Olympic
movement have adopted CAS jurisdiction as the final tribunal for appeal.45
B. International Arbitration in the Court of Arbitration for Sport
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) was established by the
International Olympic Committee on April 6, 1983.46 Its seat is in Lausanne,
Switzerland, and is therefore governed by Swiss law, which applies regardless
of where the actual proceedings take place.47 CAS's stated objective is to
convene panels which have the charge to resolve disputes arising in the field
of international sports.48 CAS thus provides "a forum for the world's athletes
and sports federations to resolve their disputes through a single, independent
and accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable of consistently
applying the rules of different sports organizations .... ""
CAS is organized into two primary divisions."0 The Ordinary Arbitration
Division handles commercial contractual disputes relating to the field of sport,
which involve parties who have agreed to CAS jurisdiction.5' The Appeals
Arbitration Division resolves disputes concerning the decisions of federations
or sporting authorities. 2 CAS may also convene an Ad Hoc Division,53 which
(1998).
" Matthieu Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court ofArbitration for Sport (CAS), in
THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 12, at 37.
" Mitten & Davis, supra note 29, at 78.
47 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R28, R45. Absent the consent of the parties, CAS operates
under Swiss law and in accordance with the CAS Code, which sets forth the procedural rules for
CAS arbitrations. Id. at R45.
48 Id. at S12.
4' Richard H. McLaren, The Court ofArbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the
World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 379, 381 (2001).
" CAS CODE, supra note 15, at S20.
5' INT'L COUNCIL OF ARB. FOR SPORT, GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 5 (1991) [hereinafter GUIDE
TO ARBITRATION], available at http://www.sportundrecht.de/ed-recht/casuidearbitration.pdf.
Contracting parties may designate CAS arbitration to resolve disputes such as sponsorship
contracts, broadcasting rights, or employment and agency contracts involving athletes, managers,
other third party liability, and civil liability claims, such as accidents to athletes during a sports
competition. See id. at 11 (explaining that the Ordinary Arbitration Division is "competent to
resolve all types of disputes" arising from "all types of legal relations between parties").
Ordinary arbitration proceedings are confidential and awards are not public, unless otherwise
provided. CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R43.
52 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at S20(b).
53 Id. at S6(8).
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operates on site at the Olympic Games to provide expedited hearings and
decisions involving disputes arising during the Games. Additionally, CAS may
issue non-binding advisory decisions relating to sports issues at the request of
any of the Olympic regulatory bodies or WADA. 4 Although originally created
by the International Olympic Committee, CAS is now independently managed
and financed by the International Court of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS)."
C. Interplay Between Domestic AAA/CAS and CAS
Rule 47 of the CAS Procedural Code provides that "[a]n appeal may be
filed with the CAS against an award rendered by the CAS acting as a first
instance tribunal if such appeal has been expressly provided by the rules
applicable to the procedure of first instance." 6 The appeals submission to
CAS must contain a copy of "the decision appealed against," in addition to the
requested relief, identified parties, and selected arbitrator.5 7 Where the hearing
is before a panel of three arbitrators, one appointed by each party, the Panel
Chair is appointed by the President of the Appeals Division.5 8
Even where a full arbitration decision is rendered by a domestic panel, CAS
Rule 57 requires a de novo hearing before the CAS tribunal.59 Regarding the
scope of CAS's review, Rule 57 provides that "[t]he Panel shall have full
power to review the facts and the law. It may issue a new decision which
replaces the decision challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back
to the previous instance."6 Although the appeals arbitration proceedings
before CAS are at no charge to the parties, each is responsible for the expenses
of its own legal fees and witnesses, which can be considerable.6
14 Id. at S12(c).
" ICAS serves as the administrative arm of CAS. TAS/CAS, General Information:
Organisation and Structure ofICAS and CAS, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-2
38-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
56 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R47; see also USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 39, 15(b)
(providing that "[t]he final award by the AAA/CAS arbitrator(s) may be appealed to the CAS").
" CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R48.
58 Id. at R54.
'9 Id. at R57.
6o Id.; see also id. at R58 ("The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable
regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or in the absence of such a choice,
according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body
which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the
application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons
for its decision.").
61 Id. at R64-R66 (noting that other than a minimum fee, the appellate arbitration
proceedings are free of charge, while parties remain responsible for the other costs of the
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1. Landis v. United States Anti-Doping Agency
The question of how the CAS panel should treat an "appeal" of an
arbitration award where a full hearing before a domestic tribunal of CAS
occurred was addressed by the Panel in the CAS arbitration Landis v. United
States Anti-Doping Agency.62 Floyd Landis was considered the winner of
the 2006 Tour de France on July 23, 2006.63 Three days later, he was notified
of a positive A sample based on the detected presence of exogenous
testosterone, which a test of the B sample later confirmed.' Landis filed for
arbitration on September 18, 2006.65 In May of 2007, after months of
extensive pre-hearing proceedings between USADA and Landis, a nine-day
public arbitration hearing was held at Pepperdine University in Malibu,
California before a panel of three arbitrators through the AAA/North American
CAS.66 On September 20, 2007, the AAA Panel issued an eighty-four page
decision, in a 2-1 ruling, finding Landis in violation of the anti-doping
regulations and imposing automatic disqualification of his Tour de France title
and a two-year suspension.67 Landis timely "appealed" to CAS in October
of 2007, with a hearing held in New York in March and April of 2008.68
The Panel first addressed USADA's statement of the Issues for Appeal, one
of which simply stated: "(1) Did the AAA Panel err in finding that the
Appellant committed an anti-doping rule violation during the 2006 Tour de
hearing). A similar structure applies at the AAA level, where the USOC pays the costs of the
arbitration, including arbitrator fees and expenses, with parties responsible for their costs of
representation. AAA SuPP. PROc., supra note 41, at R-47-R-49. The cost of Landis' defense
reportedly exceeded $2 million, with USADA spending approximately $1.3 million to prosecute.
Floyd Landis Loses CAS Appeal, VELoNEWS, June 30, 2008, http://tour-de-france.velonews.
com/article/79029/floyd-landis-loses-cas-appeal; see Bonnie D. Ford, Landis May Not Race
Again, but He's Not Done Fighting, ESPN, July 1, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/
columns/story?id=3468423 ("Two years, close to $4 million spent by both sides combined, and
an unquantifiable amount of collateral damage later, Floyd Landis' doping case rolled across
what is normally the administrative finish line .... The Court of Arbitration for Sport released
its ruling upholding a lower panel's opinion that Landis was guilty as charged of using synthetic
testosterone to boost his performance in the 2006 Tour de France.").
62 Landis v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (Landis II), CAS 2007/A/1394 (award of June 30,
2008), available at http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1 394.
pdf.
63 Id. at 2.
64Id.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 3-4.
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France?"69 Although USADA had framed the issue in a standard of review
typical for judicial appellate review,7" appeals to CAS are different. Counsel
for USADA defended the scope of review requested, arguing:
In this case, we have a de novo panel looking at a decision by
a prior panel after nine days of hearing and an 84 page decision.
Historically, when you look at the CAS de novo rule, what we
saw were cases coming from international federations where the
facts were sketchy and there were lots of issues of procedural due
process. And the de novo rule made a lot of sense because you
could cut through all those due process issues, get right to the
merits and get the case done.
That is not what we're looking at in this case at all. Here
we've had no due process issues below, we've had extensive
factual findings ....
What we would suggest is that as you're doing your work on
this case. . . pay careful attention to the lower panel's decision.71
The tribunal considered it inappropriate to consider or defer to the AAA
decision, based on the CAS procedural rule providing for a de novo hearing.
The President of the Panel clarified, "it's not for us to decide whether [the
AAA decision was] right or wrong.'72 Rather, the CAS panel was to make a
determination independent of the AAA award.73
In its written decision, the CAS did conclude differently from the AAA
panel's finding of an International Standards of Laboratories violation.74
However, the CAS Panel likewise determined that Landis had engaged in
doping and then issued the same two-year ineligibility sanction and
69 Id. at 5.
70 The standard for appellate review generally is abuse of discretion for findings of fact and
de novo review for a court's conclusions of law. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (providing
that findings of fact are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous).
7' Landis II, CAS 2007/A/1394, at 6 (comments of USADA Attorney Richard Young).
72 Id.
73 Id.
- Id. 188, at 37; cf U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Landis (Landis 1), AAA No. 30 190
00847 06, at 172 (award of Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/
active/arbitrationrulings/landis%20final%20(20-09-07)%20(3).pdf. The AAA Panel went so
far as to state that "the forensic corrections of the Lab reflect sloppy practices on its part. If such
practices [sic] continue it may well be that in the future an error like this could result in the
dismissal of an AAF [adverse analytical] finding by the Lab." Id. 290. It concluded, however,
that this violation did not cause the AAF. Id. 289.
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disqualification of results from the 2006 Tour.75 It went further, however, in
imposing a $100,000 sanction against Landis personally for "litigation
misconduct," which the Panel deemed had stemmed from unsubstantiated
allegations of fraud and misconduct against the French laboratory and failure
to call witnesses summoned to testify. 76 Specifically, the Panel stated:
Although the Appellant had the right to pursue a
comprehensive de novo appeal ... all of its multiple defenses
have been rejected as unfounded. All that the Appellant has
established after a wide-ranging attack on LNDD [the French
laboratory] is that there were some minor procedural
imperfections.77
Interestingly, the CAS Panel cited Landis' failure to narrow the claims raised
and rejected in the AAA/CAS proceeding as grounds, inter alia, to impose
sanctions in the de novo appeal to CAS. It stated:
The Appellant chose not to eliminate any of his challenges
after their rejection by the AAA Tribunal and it compelled the
Respondent to contest the same very wide range of issues on this
appeal as had already been addressed below .... Appellant
should have presented a much more focused challenge before this
Panel .... 78
2. A "Winner": Jenkins v. United States Anti-Doping Agency
In July 2006, elite-level sprinter LaTasha Jenkins was notified of a positive
test and sanction by USADA. Jenkins pursued AAA arbitration, with a
complete evidentiary hearing held in July 2007. The AAA Panel noted that
"[a]lthough duly invited, neitherthe IF (LAAF) nor WADA chose to participate
7' Landis I, CAS 2007/A/1394, at 54.
76 Id. 289, at 54-55. Landis's counsel contended that the time limitations of the hearing
rendered them unable to call additional witnesses and to fully present his evidence and cross-
examination. Amended Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, Landis v. U.S. Anti-Doping
Agency (Landis III), No. CV 08-6330-PA, at 34 (CWx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2008).
" Landis II, CAS 2007/A/1394, 289, at 54-55. The appeal filed by Landis against the
award rendered by AAA was subsequently dismissed. Id. at 54.
78 Id. 269, at 53.
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in the proceedings either as a party or an observer."7 9 The Panel issued its
final award in December 2007, ruling that the positive drug testing results of
Jenkins be set aside due to the laboratory's failure to follow International
Standards of Laboratory practices.8" Thus, Ms. Jenkins was the first and only
athlete in the USADA's history to date (then 35-1) to win a case against
USADA.8 Despite this clearing of her record and name, WADA filed an
appeal with CAS in February 2008.82 Although victorious, Jenkins had to wait
eight months after she had won at the AAA before she could return to
competition. In total, she was out of competition nearly two years (ironically,
the same approximate duration she would have served if found guilty of a first-
time doping violation).83
3. The Problem of the De Novo Option
Disputes resulting from final-instance decisions taken by tribunals within
CAS, such as the domestic arbitration process used by the AAA, as well as
from sporting federations or other sports bodies, are subject to de novo review
and a new hearing before CAS, which renders a final and binding award.84
The rationale for allowing a de novo appeal to the international CAS panel by
either party, as well as by sport federations or WADA that choose not to
participate in the national process, is rooted in the concern the national tribunal
may be more lenient when sanctioning its own athlete. However, the option
for CAS review of claims de novo does not set forth any standard for error by
the national decision. The CAS Appeals Division is thus both a first and final
instance tribunal.8 5 A new hearing before a CAS tribunal for final and binding
" U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 0019 9 07, 20 (award of Jan. 25,
2008), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration rulings/AAA%20CA
S%20Decision%20-%2OLaTasha%2OJenkins%2OJanuary/ 202008%5B2%5D.pdf.
80 Philip Hersh, SprinterJenkins Arbitration Win Appealed, LATIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/28/sports/sp-jenkins28.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 WADA CODE, supra note 16, arts. 10.2-10.3 (setting forth standard penalties against an
athlete for a first anti-doping violation at two years, with a lifetime ban for second offenses).
84 Christian Krdhe, The Appeals Procedure Before the CAS, in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION
FOR SPORT 1984-2004, supra note 12, at 99; see also Landis v. U.S. Anti-doping Agency
(Landis I1), CAS 2007/A/1394, at 6 (award of June 30,2008), available at http://jurisprudence.
tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/1 394.pdf (noting the duty of the CAS panel
to make a determination, independent of the AAA award).
85 Mitten & Davis, supra note 29, at 79-80. Mitten and Davis describe the various roles
CAS may play, stating that:
The CAS also may resolve non-Olympic athlete eligibility disputes arising out
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determination can effectively render the domestic arbitration meaningless,
except for the additional time and expense incurred.
Ill. OPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OR VACATUR OF CAS AWARDS
When an athlete receives an adverse ruling from a CAS panel, at first blush
it would appear he has a myriad of options for review of that decision under
both national and international law. However, the number of potential options
is illusory, as the grounds to vacate a CAS award are extremely limited. This
section considers options and fora for judicial review or vacatur of AAA/CAS
or CAS awards.
A. Federal Arbitration Act and Domestic Arbitration Awards
Under the Amateur Sports Act, awards issued by the AAA are final and
binding.86 As such, these domestic awards are governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).87 The FAA provides for the enforcement of written
agreements to arbitrate disputes, subject to contract law defenses.8 The FAA,
and parallel state legislation, permits judicial confirmation of arbitral awards,
the effect of which results in a judgment which has the same force as those
rendered in a court of law.89 The FAA provides limited grounds upon which
a court may vacate an arbitral award. These include:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators . . . ; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
of appeals from the final decisions of an IF pursuant to its appeals arbitration
procedure. These cases normally must be decided within four months after
the filing of an appeal. In athlete eligibility disputes other than those arising
out of the Olympic Games, the relevant IF rules and the law of the country in
which the IF is domiciled generally apply.
Id. (citations omitted).
86 Ted Stevens Olympic & Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220529(d) (2006).
8 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
88 Id. § 2 ("A written provision in any... contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.").
89 Id. §§ 9-13; see also UNIF. ARBrIRATION ACT § 22 (2000).
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the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers .... 90
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that these grounds for vacatur in the FAA
are exclusive and that parties may not agree to expand the scope of judicial
review under the FAA, such as for review of legal error. 9' The de novo option
for AAA awards, providing for review by CAS, arguably expands the scope of
review for AAA awards beyond those grounds provided in the FAA. Another
view, however, is that the CAS de novo option is a form of arbitral appellate
review, which is an accepted form of administrative remedy.92
B. CAS Awards as Foreign Arbitration Awards
The CAS Code itself permits essentially no appeal or recourse of a CAS
award, stating in Rule 59 only that the award is "final and binding."93 Rule 59
was amended from an earlier version of this Rule, which expressly stated
challenge may be had on "an extremely limited number of grounds."'94 These
grounds were:
[I]ncompetence or irregular formation of the arbitration Panel,
arbitration award going beyond the application of which the CAS
is seized or the lack of a decision on one of the major points of
the application, violation of the rights of the parties to be heard
or lack of equal treatment, [and] incompatibility of the award
with public order.95
9 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
9' Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
92 AM.ARB.ASS'N, DRAFrINGDISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES 37(2007), availableathttp://
www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4125 (recognizing limits of judicial review, proposing that "[a]nother
approach is to provide for an appeal to another panel of arbitrators who would apply whatever
standard of review the parties might specify"'). If so, a U.S. court would require exhaustion of
remedies through CAS. However, once heard by CAS, the arbitration is deemed international
and then governed by the CAS Rules and the international arbitration standards in the New York
Convention.
9 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R59.
94 GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 51, at 28.
95 Id. These are the same grounds for vacatur recognized in Article V of the New York
Convention. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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The prior rule also stated that challenges must be raised within thirty days of
the award and the "only court of appeal is the Swiss Federal Tribunal." '96 The
rule then referenced the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 97 as governing enforcement
of CAS awards.98 The amended Rule 59 now altogether omits references to
challenges to the CAS awards and expressly states that:
The award.., shall be final and binding upon the parties. It
may not be challenged by way of an action for setting aside to the
extent that the parties have no domicile, habitual residence, or
business establishment in Switzerland and that they have
expressly excluded all setting aside proceedings in the arbitration
agreement or in an agreement entered into subsequently, in
particular at the outset of the arbitration.99
Although the CAS Code in its present form is silent as to judicial review, the
awards remain subject to the standards of the New York Convention and Swiss
arbitration law.'00 Under either of these laws, a court may refuse enforcement
only under narrow circumstances.
96 GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 51, at 28.
9" New York Convention, supra note 95. This treaty is codified as U.S. law, and
incorporated into the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (providing for
enforcement of the Convention in the United States).
98 GUIDE TO ARBITRATION, supra note 51, at 28 ("If one of the parties refuses to execute the
award of his own free will, the other party may obtain its execution by initiating exequatur
proceedings before state courts of the place of execution. A very large number of countries are
parties to the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition and compulsory enforcement of
foreign arbitration awards .... It is therefore this agreement which governs the enforcement of
awards in most cases."); see also Jason Gubi, Note, The Olympic BindingArbitration Clause and
the Court ofArbitration for Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 997, 1007 (2008) (stating that the New York Convention compels
enforcement of CAS rulings).
99 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R59.
"0 CAS awards are subject to the New York Convention, which obligates signatory countries
to enforce international arbitral awards and provides limited grounds for challenge in Art. V.
Challenge to CAS awards in U.S. courts under national law, such as the Federal Arbitration Act,
to date, have not succeeded. See, e.g., Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., No. 03:08-cv-
241/LAC/EMT, 2008 WL 2567657, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008) (finding the New York
Convention applicable). As the seat of a CAS arbitration is Switzerland, Switzerland's Federal
Code on Private International Law governs. Bunesgesetz tiber das Internationale Privatrecht
[Federal Code of Private International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 176 (Switz.) [hereinafter
Swiss PILA]. An unofficial English translation of the text of the Swiss statute can be found at
http://www.umbricht.ch/SwissPIL.pdf.
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1. New York Convention
The New York Convention enumerates the grounds upon which a domestic
court may refuse to enforce an international arbitral award in Article V.'
These grounds provide two types of defenses: procedural, which may be raised
by one of the parties, and substantive, which a court may raise sua sponte.1
0 2
Athletes operating within the international framework of the Olympic
movement face particular difficulty because annulment of a CAS award by a
101 New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V. The Convention states in Article V that:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party again'st whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to
the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought,
proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made;
or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, ifthe
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement
is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
102 May Lu, Note, The New York Convention on the Recognition andEnforcement ofForeign
Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Oppose Enforcement in the United States
and England, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747, 770 (2006).
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U.S. court does not necessarily bind courts in other countries where an athlete
may seek to compete nor non-parties and governing bodies that have power to
insist terms of the CAS award be upheld.
a. Procedural Defenses
Procedural defenses to the recognition of an arbitral award are set forth in
Section V(a)(1). A defense that challenges the validity of the arbitration
agreement" 3 is measured by the applicable contract law."° Athletes who
participate in international or Olympic competition are contractually obligated
to submit their grievances to arbitration as a condition of participation.'05
Despite the mandatory nature of the arbitration contract for Olympic-level
athletes, challenges to the arbitration obligation itself rarely succeed, unless the
party can demonstrate that the arbitration provision or process itself is
unconscionable. 0 6 A claim that the agreement to arbitrate itself is invalid is
103 New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(1)(a) ("Recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused .... [If] said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties
have subjected it.").
" Id. (providing that enforcement may also be refused if "[t]he parties to the agreement...
were ... under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under that law to which the
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where
the award was made").
"' Bitting, supra note 44, at 663; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
106 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (reaffirming the
separability doctrine, which dictates that an arbitration agreement is not part and parcel with the
underlying contract). Despite challenges to the invalidity of the overall contract, a court will
enforce the otherwise unobjectionable arbitration provision. Id. See also Lu, supra note 102,
at 757 (stating that the defense of an invalid arbitration agreement is rooted in contract law and
reaffirming the separability doctrine); Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration in
the United States: Commentary and Materials, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 348, 350 (Barry E.
Carter et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003) (describing the separability doctrine as based in a separate
exchange of consideration of willingness to arbitrate). The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
proposed in the U.S. Congress, seeks to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration contracts involving
employees, consumers, and franchisees. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 1th
Cong. (2009). Arguably, the same rationale for protecting employees and consumers from
compulsory arbitration applies with equal force to athletes.
However, athletes are not named in the proposed legislation, and the Amateur Sports Act
specifically delegates to the USOC the right to require arbitration. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(4)
(2006). Only if the athlete could show the arbitration process is so one-sided as to be
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, would an athlete be able to avoid arbitration.
See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding the
arbitration agreement invalid where the agreed-upon rules were "so one-sided that their only
possible purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding"); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec.
[Vol. 38:97
SIMPLY A DRESS REHEARSAL?
unlikely to succeed. In the United States, challenging an arbitration agreement
for validity is particularly difficult under current U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence, which holds that public policy strongly favors arbitration.'0 7 A
similar outcome is likely under Swiss and international arbitration law, given
that CAS arbitration has beenjudicially recognized as a neutral process and the
understandable need for a single body to hear disputes involving the Olympic
movement.
The second defense applies where the arbitral panel exceeded its powers by
addressing matters outside the scope of the agreement or submission.' CAS
jurisdiction is expressly broad to encompass the resolution of sports-related
disputes. Yet, an arbitral panel's power is circumscribed by the authority
designated to it by the submission. For example, Landis argued in his vacatur
petition that the CAS panel acted beyond the scope of its power in imposing
monetary sanctions against the athlete that were not provided for in the
arbitration agreement.' °9 The presiding court did not have an opportunity to
address whether the CAS sanction authority was implicit or in excess of its
powers. However, CAS awards should be scrutinized to comport with scope
of powers authorized under applicable Olympic and WADA regulations.
The third defense concerns the procedures used in creating an arbitral panel
and their dealings with one another."' The CAS procedural rules set forth
written guidelines governing the qualifications and procedures for its arbitral
panels."' The CAS rules also require that its arbitrators are impartial and
disclose circumstances that might likely affect the arbitrator's independence." "
Landis also sought to vacate his CAS award on the grounds of arbitrator
partiality and conflict of interests, asserting a "revolving door" among CAS
Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding agreement valid where it did not
undermine the statutory scheme). The CAS process has been reviewed as fair and thus likely not
voided on this ground. See also Mitten, supra note 28 (discussing independence and impartiality
of CAS as upheld by SFT).
107 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, "an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy... [is] valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2006).
108 Lu, supra note 102, at 757-58. Lu also notes that this defense "typically fails because the
enforcing courts do not want to second-guess panel determinations from their own jurisdictions."
Id. at 758.
109 Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, Landis v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (Landis III),
No. CV 08-6330-PA (CWx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2008).
110 New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(1)(d); see also Lu, supra note 102,
at 758-59.
In CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R54.
112 Id. at R33.
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arbitrators on his panel who also represent private clients as advocates on other
CAS panels. Perhaps in repose to this criticism, CAS amended its rules,
effective January 1, 2010, to preclude arbitrators from also acting as
advocates. 3
A final procedural defense applies when a party is denied a full and fair
hearing."' In the United States, this is generally considered a due process
argument, judged under an American standard. 5 In DeFrantz v. USOC, the
district court ruled that the USOC was not a state actor capable of being sued
for violation of constitutional rights by athletes who, due to a political boycott,
were denied the opportunity to participate in the 1980 Summer Olympics in
MOSCOW.11 6 The expanded role of the USADA and governmental adoption of
international treaties which recognize the WADC and commit to enforce anti-
doping rules upon athletes, re-energizes the debate on whether doping
arbitrations involve state action and thus concomitant rights to due process and
other constitutional safeguards." 7 If yes, the question becomes whether CAS
.13 A court may also refuse to enforce a foreign arbitral award if a party proves it to be non-
binding. New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(l)(e). In the United States, a panel's
decision is considered binding once it resolves the issues before it and "no further recourse may
be had to another arbitration tribunal." Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 771 PLI/CoMM 147, 167 (1998). CAS, is therefore required only
to address the claims of the parties it has the authority to pass judgment on to prevent the defense
from being available.
114 New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(1)(b).
115 Lu, supra note 102, at 763-69. Lu notes several cases which may be helpful in
understanding the U.S. courts' interpretation of article V(1)(b). Id. These include Iran Aircraft
Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992), in which an arbitrator provided one of
the parties with guidance on what evidence would be necessary for making a determination in
the dispute, but when that arbitrator was later replaced, the party that sought his advice was ruled
against specifically for following it. Lu, supra, at 766-67. This was deemed not to be up to the
standards of American due process. Id. Conversely, Lu points to Fitzroy Engineering, Ltd. v.
Flame Engineering, Inc., No. 94-C-2029, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17781, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 2, 1994) as an example of a case where the defense was not found to be viable. Lu, supra,
at 764-65. In the case, a party claimed a firm failed to disclose its conflict of interest when the
first party chose the firm as its representative, and the second party had also done so in the past.
Fitzroy, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17781, at *9-10. This was not found to meet the American
standard as it could not be shown the conflict (1) existed and (2) affected the outcome. Id.
at *15.
116 De Frantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980).
117 Weston, supra note 14, at 26. See UNESCO, International Convention Against Doping
in Sports, Oct. 19,2005, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/OO14/001425/142594m.
pdf#page=2. Signatory nations to the Convention commit to enforcement of the World Anti-
Doping Code.
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provides the procedure and safeguards necessary to meet that level. 818 At the
time of this article, an American court has yet to rule one way or the other.
b. Substantive Defenses
Substantive defenses, which may be raised by the court in a jurisdiction
where enforcement of the award is sought," 9 include: (1) whether the subject
matter of the dispute can actually be arbitrated; 2 ' and (2) whether the
enforcement of the award violates the enforcement forum's public policy.'
2
'
U.S. courts adopt a narrow construction of public policy, such that an award
must "violate 'the most basic notions of morality and justice.' ,122 Even panel
decisions which are " 'arbitrary and capricious' do not qualify under this
exception.' ' 123  This leaves an American athlete with an exceedingly high
burden to demonstrate that a CAS award would be against U.S. public policy.
The Section V public policy ground for vacatur is subject to the varied
constructions of "public policy" and thus potentially a" 'major loophole in the
[New York] Convention's mechanism for enforcement.' ,124 The CAS
procedural rules, which designate Switzerland as the exclusive forum in which
to appeal, limit the possibility of varied forums' construction of public
policy.125 Accordingly, this public policy exception must be evaluated under
Swiss law standards in the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
"1 See Ryan Connolly, Note, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need To
Ensure Fair Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection
ofRights ofAccused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 195-98 (2006) (suggesting ways
for the CAS to implement new strategies to curtail performance enhancer abuse while still
protecting athletes' privacy); Mitten & Davis, supra note 29 (discussing the powers and
limitations of the CAS in regard to constitutional safeguards); Michael Strauble, The
International Convention Against Doping in Sport: Is it the Missing Link to USADA Being a
State Actor and WADC Coverage of U.S. Pro Athletes?, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 63 (2008).
119 Lu, supra note 102, at 770.
120 New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(2)(a). With an international American
athlete, it seems nearly impossible to argue that the majority of sports disputes are not suitable
for arbitration, as the ASA specifically designates arbitration as the resolution mechanism to be
used by the USOC.
121 Id. art. V(2)(b).
122 Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., No. 03:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008
WL 2567657, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008) (quoting Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic
Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 593 (7th Cir. 2007)).
123 Id.
124 Lu, supra note 102, at 774 (quoting Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe
Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)).
125 CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R28.
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2. Swiss Law and the Swiss Federal Tribunal
A judicial vacatur in a U.S. court would not necessarily free up the athlete
to compete in events abroad, or importantly, bind regulatory bodies which
control athlete access to compete in sanctioned competition. International
sporting federations are not necessarily required to abide by a U.S. court's
vacatur order, making a U.S. court's ruling of little consequence when the
athlete's livelihood is dependent upon his ability to compete throughout the
world. 126 Left with limited options, particularly when it comes to disciplinary
actions such as bans that result from doping, an aggrieved athlete's only
recourse appears to be an appeal to the SFT. The SFT may set aside a CAS
award pursuant to Swiss law, which provides limited grounds for annulment
of awards, such as for improper constitution of an arbitral tribunal, improper
assertion or rejection of jurisdiction, going beyond the scope of claims
submitted, violation of the parties' right to equal treatment or to be heard, or
where the award is incompatible with public policy.127 Even if a party is
successful before the SFT in obtaining vacatur of an award, the matter returns
to CAS arbitration for disposition. 28
Despite the option for review of CAS awards by SFT, challenges at this
level are rarely successful.'29 The SFT has ruled that" 'CAS is a true arbitral
tribunal independent of the parties, which freely exercises complete juridical
control over the decisions of the associations which are brought before it.' "130
After having instituted reforms in 1994 to further independence from the 1OC,
CAS received even higher praise from the SFT. 3' The SFT held that CAS had
become independent from the 1OC to the point where its decisions should be
"be considered true awards, equivalent to the judgments of State courts."'3 2 It
126 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that international track federation was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States).
127 Swiss PILA, supra note 100, art. 190(2) (a)-(e).
128 Rigozzi, supra note 28, at 99.
129 See Mitten, supra note 28, at 58 ("Thus far, the SFT has uniformly rejected challenges to
the merits of a CAS panel's decision.").
130 Mitten & Davis, supra note 29, at 80 (quoting G. v. Federation Equestre Interationale
(Swiss Federal Tribunal) (Mar. 15, 1993), reprinted in 1 DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998,
at 568-69 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 1998)). The case involved a horse rider named Elmar Gundel
who "claimed that the CAS was not sufficiently independent of the IOC and FEI, and as a result,
the CAS ruling against him should be abandoned." Ravjani, supra note 3, at 274. In the end,
though it expressed concerns in dicta, the court found CAS to be sufficiently independent for the
purposes of the case. Id.
3' Ravjani, supra note 3, at 274.
132 Id. at 275. The case involved two Russian skiers who allegedly violated Olympic doping
policy where independence and impartiality issues were raised because the IOC was one of the
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concluded that " '[a]s a body which reviews the facts and the law with full
powers of investigation and complete freedom to issue a new decision in place
of the body that gave the previous ruling... the CAS is more akin to ajudicial
authority independent of the parties.' ""'3
The SFT's recognition of CAS has essentially given CAS a stamp of
legitimacy and "furthered the contention that the CAS is a 'true supreme court
of world sport.' """ The SFT has declared CAS an independent and impartial
tribunal, but that does not necessarily imply that an award could not be vacated
given particular facts.'35 It would, however, also appear that the SFT's high
degree of deference to CAS decisions indicates the possibility of reversal of
the higher threshold, making an appeal an uphill battle for any athlete.
IV. THE GRIM REALITY OF ATHLETE PROSPECTS FOR VACATUR
Both Floyd Landis and Justin Gatlin took the rare step of pursuing the U.S.
legal system to seek to vacate CAS awards.
A. Gatlin's Federal Case
On September 10, 2008, CAS upheld the decision of the 2006 AAA
arbitration panel, which determined that Gatlin's positive doping test
constituted a second violation warranting a four-year ineligibility penalty. 36
The CAS panel rejected Gatlin's claim that his initial positive test was due to
a substance contained in his prescribed medication to treat Attention Deficit
Disorder and that assessing a penalty violation for such use violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act.'37 In so doing, the CAS panel reasoned that
"[t]he LAAF and [USA Track and Field] cannot be required to modify their
doping rules to accommodate a learning disability that has no effect
whatsoever on an athlete's ability to compete .... [T]he ADA does not
prevent [the Panel]... from imposing a sanction on Mr. Gatlin which takes
parties. Id. at 274-75.
"' Mitten & Davis, supra note 29, at 80-81 (quoting A. & B. v. IOC (Swiss Federal
Tribunal) (2003), reprinted in 3 DIGEST OFCAS AwARDS 2001-2003, at 684-88 (Matthieu Reeb
ed., 2004)).
134 Ravjani, supra note 3, at 275 (quoting A. & B. v. IOC (Swiss Federal Tribunal) (2003),
reprinted in 3 DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 2001-2003, at 688 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004)).
131 Id. at 274.
136 Gatlinv. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2008/A/1461 & CAS 2008/A/14-62, at 16 (final
award of Sept. 10, 2008) (appeals consolidated), available athttp://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/do
cument/2153/5048/0/award%201461 %20+%201462%20intemet.pdf.
"I Id. at 11-12.
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account of the first violation., 13' Here, the CAS panel ordered that the
decision of the AAA Panel be amended as to the commencement date of
eligibility, but otherwise remain unaltered.
Rather than filing review of the CAS decision before the Swiss Federal
Tribunal Supreme Court, Gatlin filed a lawsuit in U.S. federal court, alleging
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and seeking injunctive and
compensatory relief.'39 The court had issued a temporary restraining order
preventing USADA from enforcing the CAS suspension and thus permitting
Gatlin to participate in the 2008 Olympic Trials. Three days later, however,
the court denied Gatlin's request for a preliminary injunction on the grounds
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained
that decisions regarding an athlete's eligibility to participate are statutorily
granted exclusively to the USOC, which has adopted the administrative
remedies of the internationally based CAS. 4 ' Although the federal court
considered the CAS decision "arbitrary and capricious" and the underlying
action in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, it acknowledged that
Gatlin's only avenue of relief was with the discretion of the Swiss Supreme
Court.
1 4 1
B. Landis's Vacatur Petition
After having lost in the AAA and CAS hearings, Floyd Landis also filed a
lawsuit in U.S. federal court seeking to vacate the CAS award and penalty.142
Landis' petition alleged conflicts of interest among arbitrators in the CAS
proceeding as grounds warranting vacatur. 143 This action again raised the
138 Id. at 11. Gatlin argued that "CAS cannot impose a sanction that would have the effect
of forcing an American entity to violate American law." Id. The Panel responded by asserting
that "Gatlin [had] failed to demonstrate what conduct on the part of either the IIAAF or the
USATF would be prohibited by the ADA" and as a result concluded that there was "no duty"
on either organization to "accommodate Mr. Gatlin's disability." Id.
1a9 Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Inc., No. 03:08-cv-241/LAC/EMT, 2008
WL 2567657 (N.D. Fla. June 24, 2008).
40 The court acknowledged its limits, even if it assumed jurisdiction through the New York
Convention, noting "even if Plaintiff were to be successful in vacating the CAS decision, he
would still be faced with the prospect of petitioning the USOC to overturn its own decision as
to his eligibility to compete.. . , which as has been established is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court." Id. at *I n.1.
41 Id. at *2 ("Nonetheless, the result of this determination is quite troubling because Mr.
Gatlin is being wronged, and the United States Courts have no power to right the wrong
perpetrated upon one of its citizens.").
142 Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 109.
143 Id. at 15, 20-34.
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question of whether the U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review
a CAS award, and if so whether the court should apply the Federal Arbitration
Act, Swiss law, or standards under the New York Convention, where the Swiss
arbitration was conducted in the U.S. between two U.S. citizens, albeit before
an international panel of CAS arbitrators.'" Landis argued that the FAA, or
in the alternative the New York Convention, applied because he sought to
vacate, rather than appeal, the award.'45 He contended that he did not seek a
review of the merits of the decision, but that the decision must be vacated due
to the partiality and conflicts of interest among the arbitrators. 146 He also
asserted that the arbitrators acted in excess of their powers because the
$100,000 sanction against him was beyond the terms of the arbitration
submission.'47 The U.S. court did not rule on these arguments because Landis
" Id. at 1-3. The FAA does not provide an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction,
but the court likely has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, with diversity of citizenship
between Landis and USADA. The court did not rule on the question of whether it should apply
the standard for vacatur under the FAA, the public policy exception under the New York
Convention, or the standard under Swiss law as provided by CAS rules. See also Michael
Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court ofArbitration for
Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LoY. U. Cfu. L.J. 1203, 1246-48 (2005) (explaining that parties
are generally "forced to use Swiss law," but questioning whether U.S. law should apply). In
Gatlin, the USOC argued that the federal court's jurisdiction to overturn the arbitral decision
issued by CAS was limited to ground stated in the New York Convention.
14' The FAA may apply because both Landis and USADA are U.S. citizens. By contrast, the
New York Convention applied when Justin Gatlin sought to vacate a CAS award which involved
the IAAF (headquartered in Monaco). See Gatlin, 2008 WL 2567657, at *1 (holding that
"[p]ursuant to the [New York Convention], claims that have been properly submitted to
arbitration and ruled upon by entities such as CAS are barred from relitigation in this forum");
Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding dismissal of
former Olympic runner's suit challenging the IAAF arbitration panel's finding that she had
committed a doping offense on the grounds that the New York Convention barred Slaney's state
and federal claims against the IAAF because those claims had been subject to a valid arbitration
decision).
'4 See Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 109, at 30-31. The FAA sets forth
narrow grounds to vacate an arbitral award, including bias. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). However, the
choice of law provision in CAS rules provides that appeals of CAS awards be made to the Swiss
Federal Tribunal. CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R47. Landis need not establish "actual" bias
to have the award vacated. See New Regency Productions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films,
Inc., 501 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "lack of evidence of the arbitrator's actual
knowledge of the ongoing negotiation does not prevent a finding of evident partiality because ...
the arbitrator had a duty to investigate possible conflicts resulting from his new employment and
to disclose that employment to the parties").
' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 109, at 34. Article V of the Convention
permits a challenge to a decision "not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration."
New York Convention, supra note 95, art. V(1)(c). Landis claims that the costs issue was not
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settled the case before hearings were held. Jurisdictional issues of whether
CAS is subject to jurisdiction in the U.S. and against whom and where the
CAS imposed sanctions may be litigated were thus avoided. Reportedly, USA
Cycling had refused to issue Landis a license unless he paid the fine,
regardless of the lawsuit. The court would likely have dismissed the case and
concluded that any appeal of the CAS decision must be made to the Swiss
courts pursuant to the CAS rules because of the designated choice of law
provision. Landis declined to appeal to the Swiss courts.'48
Even if Landis were successful in having the U.S. federal court vacate the
award, the ensuing result and precise remedy is unclear. A vacatur would not
necessarily have reversed the CAS award. If the court had taken jurisdiction
under either the FAA or the New York Convention, the effect of a vacatur
"win" for Landis beyond a refusal to enforce the CAS award in the U.S. is
unclear. Ajudicial vacatur perhaps would have been enforceable against USA
Cycling, the national governing body, but not necessarily against UCI, the
International Cycling Union. A judicial vacatur also might have addressed the
monetary sanction, but realistically, the two-year ineligibility sanction would
be moot as served (other than expunging the record). A judicial vacatur could
also have resulted in the parties returning to CAS to have the merits of Landis'
case heard again.' 49
C. In Summary
Although an athlete may seek initial relief through the domestic arbitration
provided under the Amateur Sports Act, interlocking rules of the international
sporting bodies permit de novo review to a separate CAS panel seated in
Switzerland. An athlete's challenge to a CAS award must be made pursuant
to the New York Convention and applicable Swiss law, as designated in the
CAS rules. Since 1970, the New York Convention has been a part of U.S.
listed as an issue submitted for arbitration. Arguably, awarding costs is in general an inherent
issue in all court and arbitration proceedings. The statutes, including CAS, empower the judge
or arbitrator the power to award costs. Both Landis and USADA argued that costs should be
awarded against the other party. Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra, at 34-41; see also
CAS CODE, supra note 15, at R65.3 (providing that "[i]n the award, the Panel shall decide which
party shall bear them or in what proportion the parties shall share them, taking into account the
outcome of the proceedings, as well as the conduct and financial resources of the parties").
141 Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 109, at 34-41.
149 See Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and
ProfessionalArbitration, 88 MINN. L. REv. 449,466 (2004) (noting the remedial inadequacy of
a vacatur in U.S. courts).
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treaty and statutory law 5' and is the means by which an athlete or court may
seek to deny enforcement of a CAS award within the United States, yet only
the SFT has authority to set aside the CAS award pursuant to Swiss law.
Accordingly, an athlete forfeits options for judicial recourse in his home
country, and U.S. courts are effectively ousted of jurisdiction to review cases
involving athlete doping or eligibility decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. federal judge Richard Posner has stated that "there can be few less
suitable bodies than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or the
procedures for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the
Olympic Games."'' But the current structure for determining the rights of
athletes who represent the United States in international sporting competition
provides essentially no role at all for recourse to the U.S. judicial system.
Although Congress in the ASA did not expressly acknowledge the
international regulatory environment in which its athletes operate, the U.S.
delegated this process to be finally determined by a private international
tribunal and the Swiss courts.
This Article questions the wisdom of having two tiers ofjudicial review of
sports arbitration awards, where the national tier is non-binding. U.S. athletes
may lodge a grievance against USADA through the Amateur Sports Act and
USOC/AAA procedural rules, but any result may be undone where WADA or
others can appeal to a de novo panel at CAS in Switzerland. A de novo review
prolongs and significantly increases the cost of the process by requiring both
sides to repeat the full hearing conducted below and to again incur full costs.
Additionally, the de novo process is slower than an appeal on the record.
Granting standing to a de novo appeal, particularly by a non-participant,
undermines the parties' and arbitrators' serious work in the national arbitration
process, increases costs, can prolong an athlete's suspension, and amounts to
free-riding and forum-shopping. 52
"0 United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (providing for the enforcement of
the New York Convention). Section 202 provides in relevant part that "[a]n arbitration
agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, . . . which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract or agreement... falls under the Convention."
15, Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
152 See Michael Straubel, Assoc. Professor of Law, Dir. Sports Law Clinic, Valparaiso
University, Address at the Arbitrating Sports Symposium at the Pepperdine University School
of Law (Feb. 27, 2009) (on file with author) (recommending the replacement of the de novo
appeal by doctrines of deference and stringent standards of review, asserting that records at
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In the Amateur Sports Act, Congress gives the impression that the rights of
U.S. athletes will be finally and fairly adjudged in a "swift and equitable"
private dispute resolution proceeding. The Act recognizes neither the
international regulatory framework in which these athletes must operate, nor
that, effectively, an international tribunal has the final say regarding the
athlete's eligibility and sanction. The designation of Swiss law provides
certainty and finality of CAS arbitral awards, preventing a disruption by
application of varied interpretations of what constitutes a public policy
exception under U.S. or other national law. But, from the U.S. perspective,
why should Switzerland control the sports world? At a minimum, the Act
should be explicit on this point, acknowledging the delegation and governance
of international law.
To this end, I propose, first, that the statutory language of the Amateur
Sports Act be amended to reflect the reality of the international sports
arbitration system superimposed on the national arbitral process envisioned in
the Act. Second, although the change likely needs to be made at the
international level, the CAS rule, and similar provisions in the rules of the
regulatory sport bodies, should be amended to address the concerns of the de
novo rule where a full, fair and recorded arbitration hearing occurred at a CAS
national level. While the reasoning for the de novo review may be to assuage
concerns about "hometown" or national bias in favor of citizen athletes, it is
more important to provide a standard of true appellate review which examines
the underlying record for factual determinations that were clearly erroneous or
an abuse of discretion, rather than allowing a de novo review of the lower
tribunal's application of legal and regulatory provisions. Third, the rules
regarding standing to seek or participate in a de novo CAS proceeding should
delineate parties who appeared in the first-instance arbitration.
Consideration should also be given to an organizational structure whereby
CAS can address the development of law in arbitral sporting decisions. CAS
decision are increasingly cited by parties and arbitral panels as authority for
rules upon which to decide cases, yet the persuasive effect of these citations
to arbitral cases is unclear. For CAS to be a true "Supreme Court for Sport,"
it should institute a formal appellate body akin to a U.S. Supreme Court with
discretionary review, to rule on conflicting interpretations of lex sportiva
rendered by CAS panels.
The mirroring of judicial norms and practices into arbitration may seem
antithetical to the presumed efficiency and finality benefits of arbitration. But
where private arbitration is the exclusive forum whereby the careers,
arbitral hearings must be taken to serve as records of appeal).
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reputations, and participation opportunities of the world's most elite athletes
are determined, process concerns warrant the utmost attention.

